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An interesting aspect of cyberspace is the role it is playing in reviving the conflict of laws in the international arena-long relegated to
quasi-oblivion in the U.S. experience' and now, too, a dying species in
Europe, where private international law is now largely devoted to the
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I.
An important exception concerns conflicts of economic regulation, such as in the
fields of securities or antitrust, which are more properly considered issues of prescriptive jurisdiction. For the distinction between the conflict of laws and prescriptive jurisdiction, see
infra note 11.
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interpretation of Community instruments. Few and far between are the
cases in which European courts are called upon to determine the law applicable to truly international issues arising in the real world 3-and even
then, they tend to be confined to very specific categories of litigation,
such as in the field of family law, where they are clearly linked to the
continuing use of nationality as a connecting
S 4 factor in countries which
are now home to large immigrant populations.
However, while some of the conflicts now arising in cyberspace bear
a familiar aspect, such as those arising in the course of electronic commerce, and require little more than mere technical adjustment of rules or
methods applicable in analogous real-world situations,' a growing number of conflicts involve clashing fundamental public values in the
international arena. These are typically cases in which freedom of expression, particularly as protected by the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, collides with the protection of concurrent values in States
where information deemed offensive is made available. Of course, regulatory conflicts involving the clash of public values also take place in the
real world, where publications or broadcasts originating in a foreign jurisdiction may also be perceived to contain material offensive to
fundamental values in the receiving State, which may then take defensive or retaliatory measures.' However, if the cultural stakes appear
2.
Most European case law concerns the implementation of Council Regulation
44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) I. The 1980 Rome Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1972 J.O. (L 299) 32, as
amended by 1990 O.J. (C 189) 2, which gives rise, relatively infrequently, to issues of interpretation, is not (as yet) a Community instrument. The rise of international commercial
arbitration has removed much international contract litigation from European courts.
3.
The term "real world" is used here in opposition to cyberspace.
4.
Case law concerns adoption of children issuing from States which either do not
recognize or expressly prohibit adoption, although, in France at least, recent legislation seems
to have put an end to litigation. See C. civ. arts. 370-3 to 370-5 (Fr.). Another source of litigation relates to the effect to be given to Muslim unilateral marriage repudiations. In France, the
impact of the European Convention on Human Rights remains uncertain on this point. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.
T.S. No. 5,213 U.N.T.S. 221.
5.
Such conflicts concern the validity of electronic signatures, consumer protection, or
advertising practice. Traditional territorial connecting factors may require adjustment. See,
e.g., Paul Lagarde, La Loi du le Fvrier2001 Relative i l'Adoption Internationale:Une Opportune Clarification,2001 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV9 774, 776-77
(Proposals of the Groupe europien de droit internationalpriv6 on the reform of article 9 of
the Rome Convention on conflicts relating to requirements for formal validity, session of September 21-23, 2001 ).
6.
For a rare example of a "real-world" transAtlantic conflict involving freedom of
expression and defamation, see the decision of the highest French civil law court, Cass. le
Civ., Jan. 14, 1997, Soc. Gordon and Breach Science Publishersc. Association The American
Institute of Physics, 1997 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRivm 504 (Jean-Marc
Bischoff). Here, for instance, the court ordered the seizure of the publication in France.
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infinitely higher in cyberspace-a conclusion supported by the violence
of reactions which the Yahoo! decision generated on both sides of the
Atlantic7 -it may well be that these conflicts implicate an additional
ideological dimension unparalleled outside the Internet. Indeed, the Yahoo! litigation seems to point to the limits of analogy between
cyberconflicts and their real-world counterparts.
This Article furthers this comparison of cyberconflicts and the real
world, attempting to ascertain what lessons, if any, can be drawn from it.
Part I of the Article explores the interests at stake in cyberconflicts and
the relationship between technology and the law. Part II uses the French
Yahoo! court's decision to show that real-world conceptions of prescriptive jurisdiction retain their legitimacy in cyberspace. Finally, Part III
notes that the prospect of near perfect compliance offered by Internet
technology provides the opportunity to engineer mature, well-calibrated
solutions to international regulatory conflicts, which might then even
serve as a model in the real world.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CYBERCONFLICTS ISSUES

A. PrescriptiveJurisdictionin the InternationalContext

Cases such as Yahoo!,8 CompuServe,9 or more recently the Barron's

For an example of the (needlessly) aggressive comments by Ben Laurie, see Ben
7.
Laurie, An Expert's Apology (Nov. 21, 2000), available at http://www.apachessl.org/apology.html (denouncing the French court's ruling as "half-assed and trivially avoidable"); see also Joel Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS J.
261, 277-78 (2002) (critiquing Laurie's response to the ruling).
UEJF et LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc., Ordonnance Rff~rr, T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000,
8.
available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/juisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.htm; see also Yahoo! Inc.
v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisdmitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1179 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (declaring the French judgment contrary to Yahoo!'s freedom of expression as protected
by the First Amendment).
9.
When faced with the threat of criminal prosecution, CompuServe eliminated all
access to news groups that fell under Germany's antipornography faws. It then attempted to
provide "filtering" software in the form of "installment mechanisms," which were designed to
allow parents to prevent children from viewing indecent material. CompuServe intended this
solution to demonstrate a willingness to comply with German law while committing to provide continued access to users elsewhere. German authorities, however, found the installment
mechanisms insufficient because the statute outlawed the dissemination of pornography,
whether distributed to adults or children. For an abundant literature in English documenting all
these events, generally disapproving German regulatory claims as excessive, see Asaad Siddiqi, Welcome to the City of Bytes? An Assessment of the TraditionalMethods Employed in the
International Application of Jurisdiction over Internet Activities-Including a Critique of
Suggested Approaches, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 43, 89-90 (2001); Steven M. Hanley, Comment,
InternationalInternet Regulation: A MultinationalApproach, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 997 (1998); Mark Konkel, Note, Internet Indecency, InternationalCensorship, and
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litigation,' ° exemplify the rapidly expanding category of specifically international conflicts, which, by reason of their public interest dimension,

are more appropriately described in terms of prescriptive jurisdiction
than in traditional "conflict of laws" terms." National regulations that
conflict over activities conducted on the Web express fundamental cul-

tural values for each of the States concerned; indeed, the colliding values
are very often embodied in constitutional texts, international instruments
dealing with human rights, or penal legislation. Typically, an assertion of
freedom of expression in the State in which the website is located

clashes with restrictive legislation in the receiving State, designed to protect such values as the right of privacy, to restrict hate speech or libel, or

to prohibit indecency or pornography. The free availability of information collides with the negative right of the receiving State to protect itself
against outside interference, thus creating a "true" regulatory conflict: If

the receiving State can prohibit the emission of information, this comes
Service Providers'Liability, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 453 (2000); Kim Rappaport,
Note, In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued Struggle in Western Constitutional Democracies with Internet Censorship and Freedom of Speech Online, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
765 (1998); Kristina M. Reed, Comment, From the great Firewallof China to tile Berlin Firewall: The Cost of Content Regulation on Internet Commerce, 12 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 543
(1999); Amber Jene Sayle, Note, Net Nation and the DigitalRevolution: Regulation of Offensive MaterialFor a New Community, 18 Wis. INT'L L.J. 257 (2000).
10.
The Barron'sdecision has just been handed down by the Australian High Court. See
Patti Waldmeir, Regulating Cyberspace, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002. It ruled that Australian
courts had jurisdiction to entertain a libel claim brought by an Australian businessman against
Dow Jones, the U.S. publisher of the allegedly libelous material, loaded onto a server in New
Jersey. Id.
11.
Prescriptive jurisdiction is expressed in unilateral terms, allowing no room for applying foreign law. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Extraterritorailityand Conflict-of-Laws
Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101 (1998). This approach characterizes conflicts of public law, or perhaps more exactly (as far as the United
States is concerned), the reach of federal legislation in the international arena. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations defines prescriptive jurisdiction, leaving the conflict of laws
(whether international or interstate) to the Restatement (Second) on the Conflict of Laws. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402-03

(1986) [hereinafter

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 cmt. d (1969) (referring questions of public international law to the

Restatement of Foreign Relations); id. § 3 cmt. c (defining "state"). Lea Brilmayer explains
that the real distinction between the Restatement of Foreign Relations and the Restatement on
the Conflict of Laws lies in the source of domestic law: the former deals with conflicts involving federal law while the latter concerns solely state law conflicts. Lea Brilmayer, The
ExtraterritorialApplication of American Law, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 12-13. Thus,
some international conflicts are subject to choice of law under the Restatement of Conflicts,
when they arise in a field such as tort, which is not subject to federal legislation. On the other
hand, when a claim is governed by federal regulation, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction, and approach conflict-of-laws situations in terms of "prescriptive jurisdiction." For the
moment, at least, little thought has been given to the potential role of foreign law in the solution of regulatory conflicts in cyberspace; courts assert adjudicatory jurisdiction with a view to
applying forum law.
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close to interference in the regulation of activities covered by constitutional immunity in the State where the website is located; conversely, not
to do so looks very much like allowing cultural expansionism. Either
way, the regulatory claim of one State will appear pernicious or intrusive
to the other: For example, the United States jurisdiction in which the
website is located will object to any corrective action taken by the receiving State as curtailing fundamental freedom of expression, while the
latter, in turn, has no reason to accept that First Amendment protection
should extend to activities conducted within its virtual borders in violation of its own constitutional or criminal law. Thus, on the one hand,
persons in the United States denounce European regulations restricting
the content of public expression as extraterritorial meddling with democratic values;12 on the other, the same values cause European observers to
denounce the perverse race to the bottom generated by First Amendment
liberalism, as neo-Nazi websites seeking safe haven relocate massively
13
across the Atlantic.
B. How Internet Technologies ExacerbateTraditionalDifficulties
Although such conflicts can and do occur through the use of traditional media, new communication technologies have sharply exacerbated
the difficulties encountered in the real world. Indeed, data circulate instantaneously over the Internet, making the damage caused by the
harmful use of information potentially far greater and far more difficult
to prevent than in cases of data traveling through more traditional channels. Conversely, given the ubiquity of such effects, there is a risk that
multiple courts will assert jurisdiction simultaneously over activity conducted on the Web, with potentially devastating consequences in the
form of overregulation and contradictory decisions. Observers frequently
express fear that the mere "press of a button" suffices to subject a given4
notice.]
activity to foreign extraterritorial jurisdiction without proper
12.
Some Europeans share this reaction. See, e.g., Ben Laurie, supra note 7. A French
author recently described the French Yahoo! court's decision as "exorbitant." See generally
Daniel Arthur Lapr~s, L'exorbitante affaire Yahoo, 4 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 975

(2002).
13.

This is not to suggest that the flocking of Nazi websites to the United States is not

also denounced in this country. See Lisa Guernsey, MainstreamSites Serve as Portals to Hate,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 2000, at Gl; Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 275.

14.
See, e.g., Robert M. Harkins, Jr., The Legal World Wide Web: Electronic Personal
Jurisdictionin Commercial Litigation, or How to Expose Yourself to Liability Anywhere in the
World with the Press of a Button, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 451 (1997). The courts themselves sometimes express similar ideas. See, e.g., Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp. 160, 171
(S.D.N.Y.1997) (concluding that "no user could avoid liability under the New York Act simply by directing his or her communications elsewhere, given that there is no feasible way to
preclude New Yorkers from accessing a website, receiving a mail exploder message, or participating in a chat room"); Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the

MichiganJournal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 24:673

However, if the conflict is more acute in virtual space, it is not only because of the inherent ubiquity of information and the magnified spillover
effects of corrective action, but also and primarily because of the philosophical premises on which the World Wide Web is actually perceived
to function, at least in the United States. For many, the Web's very architecture, which favors the free flow of information, anonymity, and
geographical indeterminacy, embodies the United States' values of free
expression, of which it constitutes the technological projection. Subsequently, any foreign regulatory attempt to inhibit the flow of information
is considered not only as a violation of First Amendment immunity, but
as vitiating the democratic values embedded in the structure of the
Web.' 5 Typically, the French decision in Yahoo! drew criticism
in the
6
Unites States as a claim to "control thinking" in cyberspace.1
C. A Paradox:Technology in Lieu of Enforcement
At first glance, therefore, cyberconflicts might seem to have little to
teach private international law in the real world, and as little to gain from
recourse to traditional analytical tools. In view of the acute ideological
charge of international conflicts involving fundamental freedoms,
nothing appears to prevent litigation from escalating into primitive
Laker-type judicial warfare, 7 where the winner is clearly the most effective enforcer. 8 It may, however, be time to stop and consider that the
free-flowing architecture of the Web results from man-made software,
whereas real world constraints are given or, at least, tend to be perceived
as inexorable. To what extent does this difference shed any light on the
way in which Yahoo!-type conflicts could be managed? Paradoxically,
Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 790-93 (2001) (discussing the Pataki court's
application of the Dormant Commerce Clause to state criminal laws concerning Internet

transmissions of pornography to minors).
15.
16.
17.

Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 272-75.
See infra text accompanying note 24.
The complex LIker Airways antitrust litigation presents a notorious example of

transAtlantic judicial warfare, in which British and U.S. courts exchanged anti-suit and
counter-anti-suit injunctions to protect prescriptive jurisdiction. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 235 U.S. App. D.C. 207 (1984); see also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATIoN AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS 5 (1996) (analyzing this

"struggle over jurisdiction").

18.
The respective strengths of the contenders would thus appear to be measured exclusively in real-world terms; enforcement will involve the seizure of the defendant's assets
located within the regulating State, diverse forms of injunctive relief, or more troubling forms
of pressure applied directly on network participants. On the real dangers of exerting pressure
through censorship on network participants, see Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 277, warning

against the danger of overrating the chilling effect of State regulation of Internet communications, when far more troubling avenues are available. These may include "denial-of-service"
attacks with a view to shutting down foreign websites, creation of viruses to cripple foreign
computers, and more generally deployment of cyberenforcement agencies. Id.
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whereas conflicts involving the exercise of free expression over the Web
initially might appear infinitely more difficult to resolve than their realworld counterparts, the converse is probably true. This Article shows
that, if man-made technology shapes cyberspace, it makes achieving a
balanced solution of international regulatory conflicts potentially far easier on the Web than in geographical space. This is simply because
transnational compliance is clearly more attainable than in the real
world, through the use of technology itself. A regulating State now has
the means to prevent given data from being made accessible within its
borders simply by ensuring that adequate gateway software is put into
place; 9 technology readily bypasses slippage, cost, and all the familiar
difficulties generally linked to international enforcement of legislative
prescriptions or judicial decisions in the real world. This means, in turn,
that it is all the more important that States assert prescriptive jurisdiction
only when it is clearly reasonable to do so, since unjustified technological interference with the free flow of information in cyberspace would be
both destructive and counterproductive. To the extent that technology
lends greater credibility to regulatory claims over cyberspace than in the
real world, great care should be taken to see that such claims are properly calibrated.
D. Two- Way Relationship Between Law and Technology
This is where the real world may have much to teach about the relationship between law and technology. It has been witness in recent times
to the gradual common acceptance of the effects doctrine' ° as a legitimate basis for international prescriptive jurisdiction. Similarly, the
exercise of regulatory jurisdiction based upon the effects suffered within
the forum State seems eminently reasonable in cyberspace. Adopting this
approach would optimally regulate cross-border flows of information by
allowing restrictions only when the regulating State has a substantial
interest in preventing the flow of data within its territory, and only to the
extent necessary to implement the protective policy involved. Technology increases the credibility of regulatory claims, but it also allows a
State asserting prescriptive jurisdiction to adjust the scope of such claims
functionally, so as to allow only those restrictions strictly necessary to
prevent harm within its borders. The French Yahoo! court fully understood this complex relationship between law and technology on the Web.
The difficult question of who should bear the burden is discussed in the text below.
19.
See infra Section l.B. Here, we focus on the technical possibility of ensuring near-perfect
compliance.
20.
The "effects" doctrine will be described below. See infra Section II.B. This doctrine allows the regulating State to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign conduct with
impacts on interests located within its borders.
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It asserted regulatory jurisdiction on the basis of offensive effects of the
data accessible on the Yahoo! Inc. website within French territory, but
ordered that the data be made unavailable only to French-based internauts. The constraints it imposed on the free flow of information in the
name of the fundamental values of French society did not affect access
to that website from any other territory. Virtual space thus evidences a
two-way relationship between international jurisdiction and technology.
On the one hand, technology can make the assertion of jurisdiction
effective to an extent unattainable in the real world. Conversely, proper
definition of the limits of prescriptive jurisdiction is crucial to the coherence of State regulation of cyberspace.
II. LESSONS FROM THE REAL WORLD: THE LEGITIMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL "EFFECTS" JURISDICTION

To show that real world yardsticks retain their legitimacy in cyberspace, this Part first examines the "separatist" claim that the use of a
borderless medium in some way modifies the bases of regulatory jurisdiction as designed for the real world. Relayed by conventional wisdom
about the structure of cyberspace, the separatist claim draws normative
conclusions from the freedom with which data can circulate over the
Web.2 1 Because the Internet provides a technical medium for unfettered
expression, restrictive regulation is made to appear illegitimate-a denial
of the democratic values it embodies .22 In the international arena, the
perception of Internet architecture as a given also creates important implications for the solution of regulatory conflicts. Thus, the free flow of
information similarly gives rise to implicit normative conclusions regarding the allocation of international prescriptive jurisdiction. Assertion
of regulatory authority by States seeking to impose restrictions on freedom of expression is seen as incompatible with the very structure of
cyberspace. But it will be shown that such a perception reverses the
proper relationship between law and technology, allowing separatist values to dictate the scope of international jurisdiction. Indeed, Section A
shows that, on closer scrutiny, the design of the Internet depends entirely
on the ideological choices that dictate technological development. So, as
Section B demonstrates, no plausible reason exists to displace the yardsticks of regulatory authority as defined in the real world.

21.
See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 14 (discussing conventional wisdom about
cyberspace found in the cases).
22.
Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 273-74.
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A. Cyberspace as Ideology
This Section shows that the separatist claim is sustainable only insofar as the borderless quality of the Internet is accepted as a given. As
Lawrence Lessig has demonstrated, the development of filtering technology for purely commercial purposes belies this premise, exposing
conventional wisdom about the Web as ideology, not fact.
1. The "Safe Haven" Argument
As reactions to Yahoo! and similar litigation illustrate, many believe
that the very design of the Internet carries strong normative implications
for solutions of regulatory conflicts. In a borderless medium, claims by a
State to restrict the flow of data perceived to affect welfare within its
territory appear to lose their real-world legitimacy. Thus, when activities
covered by freedom of expression at the place the website is located are
considered elsewhere to undermine concurrent fundamental values such
as privacy or the prohibition of hate speech, the defendant systematically
invokes the "safe haven" argument. As Joel Reidenberg explains, the fact
that the Web, instead of some other, more traditional medium, carries the
cross-border effects of the regulated activity would seem to modify accountability, as though activities in borderless space somehow surmount
local laws.23 Favoring the free flow of data, the Internet is seen as conferring on expression carried through its medium a status that remains
mysteriously beyond the thrust of the laws of the States in which users
access the information. Thus, the geographical indeterminacy of cyberspace seems to set aside the principles governing prescriptive
jurisdiction in the real world.
The explanation resides in the fact that the technological architecture
of the Web clearly embodies values expressed in the First Amendment,
making the very idea that the free movement of data might encounter the
regulatory claims of other States seem an anathema to the Web's ideological foundations. Thus Ben Laurie, computer expert consulted by the
French Yahoo! court, states that "what is being fought over is literally
what people think. No one should be able to control what I know or what
I think ... The Internet is pure information."24 When, in the more recent
Barron's litigation, the Australian Supreme Court ruled that Australian
courts had jurisdiction to hear a claim that information loaded on a New
Jersey server was libelous under Australian law, the demise of the 25Internet as a democratic forum of free expression was widely predicted.

23.
24.
25.

Id. at 272-75.
Laurie, supra note 7.
Waldmeir, supra note 10.
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This perception of the relationship between law and technology extends beyond the international sphere. Similar attitudes exist in domestic
litigation within the United States over the thrust of the Dormant Commerce Clause and in First Amendment cases. In the Dormant Commerce
Clause context, restrictive regulation is perceived as unduly burdening
26
interstate electronic commerce. Where freedom of expression is involved directly, it is perceived as preempting restrictive regulation based
on concurrent values, such as the protection of minors from access to
pornography. Whereas such a claim would hardly seem credible in a
real-world context, free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment
appears to acquire a worldwide immunity, to the point of excluding the
regulatory claims of the State in which harmful effects are suffered.
What about the Web makes such an argument appear sustainable?
2. Technology as a Given
Conventional wisdom about the Internet tends to present geographical indeterminacy and the free flow of data as givens. As Jack Goldsmith
and Alan Sykes have shown, in the context of Internet litigation within
the United States, courts looking for "facts" about the Web tend to find
that the ubiquity of information, and the corollary risk of overreaching
countervailing measures, justify giving precedence to the freedom of
expression." Claims about the architecture of the Internet include universal availability of information, absolute indeterminacy of geographical
location and other identity factors, and indefinite exposure to liability
under restrictive regulation, whatever real links exist between the exposed activities and the regulating State. 9 Correlatively, regulation itself
is perceived as illegitimate. In other words, since the Web knows no
frontiers, data must circulate freely; as no natural frontiers exist, States
may not erect them artificially. This perception of the architecture of the
Web clearly impacts the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in the international arena. Those who believe that the Internet represents

26.
See, e.g., Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also
Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 14, at 790-94 (discussing relevant case law); id. at 802-08
(applying economic analysis of cross-border burdens to Internet communications).
27.
See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (invalidating two provisions of the federal Communications Decency Act of 1996 due to the First Amendment);
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F. 3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding order preliminar-

ily enjoining enforcement of the federal Child Online Protection Act due to likelihood that the
Act violated free speech guarantees).
28.
Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 14, at 788.
29.

Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 272-75.
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undifferentiated space, find any attempt to introduce "zoning" 3 ° within
its confines intolerable.
As such, arguments that tie up man-made space and law are not so
unusual. Thus, free markets have obvious normative implications for the
legitimacy of regulatory claims; as shown by litigation involving the
Dormant Commerce Clause in the United States or the market freedoms
in the European Union, risks of double burdens or overregulation are
3'
frequently invoked to limit prescriptive jurisdiction in such a context.
No one doubts that deliberate policy shapes free markets or that creating
an economic space for the unfettered movement of goods and services
requires constraints on regulatory jurisdiction. Curiously, however, the
architecture of the Internet is not generally seen as being the product of
software. As Ben Laurie's statement shows, the Internet is perceived as a
natural space; because the Web enables the free cross-border flow of
data, such a state of affairs should, as the argument goes, be taken as a
fait accompli-an inexorable fact dictating regulatory abstention in the
international arena.
3. Normative Implications of Filtering Technology
Although the vision of cyberspace as a borderless natural space still
appears to carry weight, commentators also increasingly perceive it as
delusional." The rapid development of filtering and "zoning" techniques,
now used for purely commercial reasons such as targeting advertising to
a particular public, provides clear evidence that geographical indeterminacy on the Internet is not inevitable, but results from ideological choice.
As the current state of Internet technology demonstrates, the borderlessness of the World Wide Web does not represent an intractable given.
Concluding otherwise allows technology to disguise policy choices. We
should ultimately reject the "safe-harbor" defense as having no more
relevance than in the real world, precisely because the design of the Web
is what we make it; if information flows freely, it is because we allow it
to do so. Much of the conventional wisdom about the functioning of the
Web grew out of the initial state of the art, under which "zoning" techniques were inconceivable. Improved technology, designed to identify
various categories of users, means that claims of the ubiquity of information accessible on the Web, whether due to the inherent nature of the
medium or to its accidental evolution, no longer ring true. This entails a
30.
Lawrence Lessig & Alan Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and
Technical Model, 98 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1999) (coining the expression "zoning").
31.
For the impact of the "double burden" argument in the European Union, see JUKKA
SNELL, GOODS AND SERVICES IN EC LAW: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
FREEDOMS (2001).

32.

See Lessig & Resnick, supra note 30; Reidenberg, supra note 7.
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fundamental consequence regarding the allocation of regulatory authority in cyberspace. If the Internet is not naturally borderless, then realworld yardsticks for the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction retain their
legitimacy.
B. Legitimacy of Real- World Yardsticks
for PrescriptiveJurisdiction
This Section demonstrates that the regulating State may legitimately
impose international "zoning" to protect itself from the effects of information made available elsewhere and perceived to be harmful. This
requires showing that effects-based jurisdiction does not necessarily entail conflicting regulatory burdens, which would arise if national courts
simultaneously asserted prescriptive jurisdiction over the same conduct
"at the press of a button." New filtering technologies lessen the risk of
accidental spillover and increase the means for preventing much-feared
overregulation.
1. Effects and Targeting
Since the new types of regulatory conflicts emerging in cyberspace
involve public values,33 courts have tended to reason in terms not of conflict of laws but of prescriptive jurisdiction, using criteria developed in
real-world clashes of public economic regulation. 34 In such cases, contemporary practice on both sides of the Atlantic seems to have converged
more or less from a "place-of-conduct" rule to an "effects" test.35 Indeed,
recent applications of economic analysis to the conflict of laws have
shown that the "effects" test seems to make the best sense in terms of
33.

Indeed, globalization seems to have given rise to a new taxonomy of international

conflicts-whether through increased interconnectedness or the use of new technologieswhich now include regulatory clashes with strong public law components. On this new category of international conflicts, hitherto identified with conflicts of economic regulation, see
Jurgen Basedow, Conflicts of Economic Regulation, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 423 (1994); see also
Jurgen Basedow, Souverainetd territoriale et globalisation des marchds: le domaine
d'application des lois contre les restrictions de concurrence, 264 RECUEIL DES COURS 9
(1997).
34.
See supra note 14.

35.
On the three different tests (conducts, effects, and balancing of interests) which
appear in U.S. practice, and their relationship to tests used in choice of law, see William
Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101 (1998). While the balancing test proposed by section 403 of the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations was not rejected in the Supreme Court's most recent
ruling, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993), it is clear that the way in
which the test was implemented in that case comes very close to reinstating the "effects" test.

The latter seems to have been adopted in fact, if not explicitly, by the Court of Luxembourg in
the Woodpulp case. Case 89/95, Woodpulp, 1988 E.C.R. 5193. For a discussion of section 403,
see LOWENFELD, supra note 17, chs. 2, 3.
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global welfare3-a consideration which should bear a particular weight
in the present context of worldwide interplay of regulatory authority.
Where conflicts arise in cyberspace, courts both in Europe and the
United States have asserted personal jurisdiction on this basis, and have
then proceeded to apply forum law.37 "Substantial effects" within the
regulating State generally justify prescriptive jurisdiction, whether they
arise in the real world or cyberspace.3" To establish personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, however, deliberate targeting may be both necessary
and sufficient. 39 Using targeting as a yardstick has enabled courts of
various countries to exercise jurisdiction sufficient to incriminate hate
speech, indecency, libel, invasions of privacy, and copyright violations.4 n
"Targeting" involves the difficult task of discriminating between active and passive websites, nl requiring considerable thought as to the
See, e.g., Joel Trachtmann, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisidction and
36.
Choice of Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 34-41 (2001). However, Andrew Guzman argues that the
effects test as such will not guarantee global efficiency, since a State regulating on that basis
will have taken into account exclusively local costs and benefits. As a result, a globally optimal transaction (i.e., a transaction which increases global welfare) may nevertheless be
regulated restrictively by any State in which its harmful effects are in excess of its local benefits, irrespective of its positive impact elsewhere. Andrew Guzman, Choice of Law: New
Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883, 897 (2002). To be allowed under the effects test, argues
Guzman, a given transaction must not only increase global welfare but be perceived as optimal
in all of the States in which it generates effects. Id. at 906-08. Although this argument is convincing, it is also clear that a global calculus of costs and benefits could only be carried out
within a cooperative framework. Failing that, the (second) best yardstick of prescriptive jurisdiction is still the one that allocates legislative authority to the States with the greatest
incentive to allow or refuse a given transaction, even if incentive must rhyme here with selfinterest.
For an analysis of the case law, see Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 269-71. In the
37.
Yahoo! case, French personal and prescriptive jurisdiction was justified either under the territorial yardstick of Code Pdnal article 113-2 (because the infraction presumptively took place
on French territory since the harm, an element of the infraction, took place there), or the personal criterion of the victims' French nationality under Code P6nal article 113-7. Both
yardsticks endorse the "effects" test.
Under section 403(2)(a) of Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, one of
38.
the tests of reasonableness to be applied to international prescriptive jurisdiction lies in the
"substantial, direct and foreseeable effect [of the activity] upon or in the territory." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403(2)(a).
Courts seem to use a "sliding scale" which requires either interactivity or purpose39.
ful availment in order to establish the minimum contacts required for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction. For a very complete analysis of the case law on this point, see Siddiqi, supra note
9, at 72.
For an analysis of U.S. cases, see Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 269-71 and see in40.
fra, the text accompanying notes 45-48. In addition, on the trend toward an "effects" test in
cyberspace, see Michael Geist, The Legal Implications of the Yahoo! Inc. Nazi Memorabilia
Dispute, JURISCOM.NET (Jan.-Mar. 2001), at http://www.juriscom.net/en/uni/doc/yahoo/
geist.htm.
41.
The distinction is not an easy one-any more than is demonstrating purposeful
available for jurisdictional purposes in real-world situations. For example, in Panavision International,the court required "something more" than a passive website to show that activity
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weight to be given to various factors such as language, which may or
may not be significant, according to the specific circumstances of each
case. 42 However difficult the courts' task in defining the effects which
legitimate the international assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction, targeting means that data deliberately made accessible within the forum State
can lead to criminal liability there, even if it receives legal protection in
the place of conduct. The fact that it is protected "at home," is no more a
valid jurisdictional defense in cyberspace than it would be in the real
world. Although defendants characterize such assertions of prescriptive
jurisdiction as "imperialism," it is hardly necessary to show that once the
ideological arguments linked to the architecture of the Web are set aside,
there is nothing "exorbitant" about extraterritorial regulation on the basis
of conduct targeted into the forum territory.43 In this respect, the French
court's "extraterritorial" injunction in the Yahoo! case is by no means
exceptional: in the United States, the Playboy court required a website
located in Italy to make material published under the United States
trademark, "Playmen," inaccessible to users in the United States; 44 in
Nat'l Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp., a Canadian website was

preliminarily enjoined from transmitting copyrighted programming into
the United States; 45 the People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp. court
ordered a casino based in Antigua to cease offering gambling over the
is targeted at the forum state. 141 F 3d at 1320-22 (quoting Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc.,
130 F3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997) and distinguishing it due to a lack of targeting). In Cybersell, two
corporations, organized in different states, used identical trade names on the Internet without
specifically intending to injure each other. In Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp.
1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997), Judge McLaughlin explains:
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business
over the Interet. If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files
over the Intemet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situations
where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is
accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive website that does little more
than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for
the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by interactive
Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host computer.
Id. It is of course the defining of the "middle ground" which creates difficulty. See Siddiqi,
supra note 9, at 72. Courts seem to use a "sliding scale" which requires either interactivity or
purposeful availment in order to establish the minimum contacts required for the assertion of
personal jurisdiction.
42.
The Yahoo! case itself illustrates this difficulty. That the website targeted a Frenchspeaking public seems clear from the use of French-language advertisements. But if using
French in California evidences the targeting of users in France, it hardly follows that the use
of English necessarily targets, say, an Australian public.
43.
At least one French author strongly disagrees. See Lapr~s, supra note 12, 993-95.
44.
Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, 939 F. Supp. 1032 (1996).
45.
53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1831 (2000).
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Web to New Yorkers; 46 and in PanavisionInternationalLP v. Teoppen, an
Illinois resident was held to be subject to suit in California for registering a domain name in Illinois, when his activity was directed to the
forum state.

47

2. "Zoning" Limits Ubiquity, Negating the "Notice" Argument
As we have already seen, the objection immediately raised in Internet litigation is the "notice" argument, linked to the alleged ubiquity of
information on the Web. Because given content may come under the
definition of libel or hate speech in innumerable jurisdictions, there appears to be a danger of massive overregulation; although the risk of
conflicting regulatory burdens also exists in the real world, conventional
media do not create the same likelihood of widespread unintentional effects. Two objections show the fallacy of this notice argument, one
normative, the other technological.
First, prescriptive jurisdiction carries the same limits in cyberspace
and the real world-the State cannot legitimately exercise jurisdiction
over activities on the basis of effects that either do not specifically target
its territory or remain insubstantial.4 ' The distinction, now gaining
ground in court practice, between interactive and passive websites, responds to this idea, linking the legitimacy of regulatory claims to the fact
that information has been made deliberately accessible in the forum
State, as in the Yahoo! case.49 AS filtering technology improves, the risk
of accidental spillover decreases: "zoning" techniques lessen the force of
the argument that effects can accidentally arise anywhere. The flow of
information can be mastered in cyberspace, in the same way that one can
avoid sending publications via traditional media deliberately into another
State. This is precisely the thrust of the French Yahoo! decision, which
took pains to check the feasibility of limiting access in France of material loaded on the California website; if the offensive data is nevertheless
made accessible in France, it cannot be the result of an accident. As the
Yahoo! court itself recognized, this does not entirely rule out seepage,
particularly as engineered by third parties. However, it has been pointed
out that it would be fair to provide a "reasonable efforts" defense, to

46.
47.
48.

714 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
The targeting of the regulating State's "territory" is of course metaphorical. In many

cases, the stigmatized activity attempts to affect the forum State's economic interest.
49.
See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Coin, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa.
1997); see also supra note 5. For an interesting critique of the interactivity yardstick, see Siddiqi, supra note 9, at 74, pointing out that the commercial value of a website is not necessarily
dependent upon its interactivity.
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protect service providers who have taken care to comply with legislative
restrictions in targeted States.5 °
Secondly, using zoning techniques, while limiting accidental seepage of information, also allows courts to adjust the restrictions required
by their local law to mitigate harmful effects without overreaching. Contrary to popular belief, overregulation can be mastered more easily in
cyberspace than in the real world, which provides far less opportunity for
the fine-tuning of regulatory jurisdiction. Courts can limit the restrictive
effect of regulation and incriminations to activities that directly affect
welfare within their own jurisdiction. Unnecessary regulatory spillover
can be avoided if restrictions to the free flow of information, for example, can be limited to a given set of geographically located users. Thus,
the French Yahoo! court ordered that the content of the contentious website should be prevented from being accessed in France, where it was
illegal, without affecting its accessibility elsewhere. In other words, in
exercising prescriptive jurisdiction to apply a penal statute to foreign
conduct on the basis of harmful effects suffered in France, the Yahoo!
court made sure that the impact of its own corrective action was exactly
adjusted to those effects. As little as five years earlier, at the time of the
CompuServe litigation, striking a similar balance proved less easy; responding to the threat of criminal prosecution, CompuServe eliminated
access worldwide to the pornographic chat group illegal under German
law before it was able to come up with software (nevertheless judged
inadequate by the German courts) enabling parents to install blocking
mechanisms for children.5 But because Internet technology now makes
"zoning" possible, no compelling reason exists to alter the "targeting"/"effects" test which justifies prescriptive jurisdiction in the real
world. When deliberate or targeted, obnoxious consequences felt within
the forum State can hardly be challenged as a valid basis for restrictive
regulation. Similarly, restrictions designed to operate exclusively with
respect to effects produced within the territory of the regulating State
remain clearly within the bounds of international legitimacy. All in all, it
is far easier, technically, to parcel out prescriptive jurisdiction optimally
in cyberspace than in the real world. Technology allows courts to prescribe the least intrusive solution. At the same time, and because
regulatory reaction can be fine-tuned to harmful effects, the risk of externalities in the form of overregulation can practically be eliminated.
This is particularly so since zoning techniques available on the Web
cause prescription and enforcement jurisdiction to coincide. Technology
harnessed to the law-and not the reverse-provides the means of ensur50.
51.

Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 276.
See supra note 9.
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ing perfect compliance with regulation. Given this premise, cyberspace
has much to teach the real world.
III. LESSONS

FROM CYBERSPACE: WHEN PRESCRIPTION

AND ENFORCEMENT COINCIDE

So what's so different about regulatory conflicts on the Web? Part II
showed that, as a product of technology, cyberspace should not modify
real-world principles of accountability. In fact, as this part of the Article
will demonstrate, the very technology that defines the structure of cyberspace provides means to ensure near-perfect correlation between the
scope of regulatory authority and the power of enforcement unattainable
in the real world. The real specificity of cyberconflicts lies in the potential for filtering or zoning techniques to create a Coasean space of
costless compliance," which could not be achieved through real-world
enforcement processes. Section A shows that enhanced means for ensuring compliance should provide a correlative incentive to fine-tune
prescriptive jurisdiction. Section B acknowledges, however, that despite
the normative potential of technology, the difficult question as to who
bears the burden of implementation remains unanswered.
A. Creatinga CoaseanSpace of Watertight Compliance
This Section argues that, putting aside for the moment the issue of
the burden of implementation, filtering technology has the potential of
allowing a regulating State to render illegality technically impossible
within its prescriptive sphere. This ability allows the State to eliminate
inefficiencies stemming from the real-world differences between the
scope of regulatory claims and its power to enforce, creating incentives
to adjust its prescriptive jurisdiction to match those restrictions functionally necessary to bring about its protective regulatory goals. Cyberspace
thus provides conditions for optimal regulatory coordination, which remains unattainable in the real world.
As Lessig and Resnick point out, rules can be inscribed into the
software itselfe3-in the very same way that, conversely, Internet technology can give expression to the idea that the Web is comprised of a
lawless space. In a purely domestic context, for example, filtering
52.

See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869,

900 (1996) ("Perfectly zoned, cyberspace could be that place where there are no collective
action problems-the Coasean space required by Roberto Unger's vision of plasticity; the

plasticity of Unger assumed in the Coasean world.").
53.
See Lessig & Resnick, supra note 30 (discussing costs and benefits of using different architectures to regulate speech); see also Reidenberg, supra note 7.
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techniques that allow, say, identification of users' ages can ensure immediate near-perfect compliance with legal rules prohibiting the
communication of pornographic data to minors. Software, put into the
direct service of State regulation, can cause illegality to become a technical impossibility. Of obvious relevance to the domestic context, where
it allows perfectly calibrated balancing of interests between conflicting
values (in our example the adult freedom of expression and protection of
minors), the same technology holds important potential to solve the
regulatory conflicts on the international scene. Developing filtering techniques that allow geographical identification of Internet users can ensure
the exact correlation of prescription and enforcement while "zoning"
technology can similarly allocate regulatory authority. The end result is a
far cry from the lawless space conceived by Internet separatists. Harnessed to regulatory objectives, filtering technology could free courts
from the need to rely on the less-than-perfect enforcement techniques of
the real world, while providing greater security to service providers, who
would be protected from unwanted accountability due to accidental
transgression of restriction regulation.
1. Absence of Real World Inefficiencies
In the real world, discrepancy between prescription and enforcement
traditionally causes various inefficiencies, including evasion of the law.
Thus, a judgment awarded in the forum State on a perfectly legitimate
jurisdictional basis may nevertheless remain internationally ineffective if
the defendant has no assets within forum territory on which enforcement
can take place locally. 4 Since enforcement abroad will always be subject
to some form of scrutiny of the content of the forum judgment by the
foreign courts, it is easy for a defendant to remove assets to a safe harbor
in any jurisdiction which will refuse to recognize that judgment-on
public policy grounds, for instance. While obviously a cause for concern
in cases where the basis for prescriptive jurisdiction is legitimate, this
discrepancy between prescription and enforcement also serves as a natural check on exorbitant regulatory claims. When the regulating State
overreaches its legitimate sphere of prescriptive jurisdiction, any judgment awarded in such conditions is doomed to nonrecognition abroad.
The same discrepancy between prescription and enforcement has
also had important consequences on the effectiveness of regulation in
cyberspace. A service provider who wishes to enjoy immunity from a
given State's restrictive regulation--even if its regulatory claim is
54.
Extraterritorial freezing orders and other forms of injunctive relief in common law
jurisdictions can remedy this difficulty. Parties' desires to avoid being in contempt of court
allow judges to effectively employ these injunctive control mechanisms.
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legitimate by reason of substantial effects on welfare within its borders-may do so simply by removing all potential enforcement
leverage-essentially assets-from that State's territory. Conversely, this
discrepancy may act as an important check on the risk of overregulation.
Not all the States claiming to regulate activities on the Web necessarily
have the correlative power to enforce the restrictions they impose, so that
exorbitant regulatory claims may be ignored by service providers who
have no connection with the regulating State in the form of assets or
other real-world bases for direct or indirect enforcement. Thus, the real
world provides natural adjustment techniques for correcting exorbitant
regulatory claims.
However, in cyberspace, regulating States may ensure immediate
compliance by inscribing rules into the available software, even in situations where no real-world means of enforcement exist. If a regulating
State employs zoning technology to block access to data it deems offensive, a content provider contemplating trading in such data can no longer
choose to risk liability or criminal sanctions in the hope that enforcement
processes cannot reach it. Understandably, such a perspective of immediate compliance might give rise to concern.
When the regulating State does not have any legitimate basis to assert prescriptive jurisdiction, the fact that technology nevertheless
provides the means to ensure mandatory compliance might seem to herald the death of free enterprise and expression in cyberspace. However, if
the regulating State does lack reasonable grounds for exercising
prescriptive jurisdiction, this can only mean that effects within its
territory are insubstantial or that it has not, in fact, been targeted. The
filtering of access to data cannot therefore be of great import either to its
own population or to the author of the regulated activity.
2. Enhanced Need for Optimal Definition
of Prescriptive Jurisdiction
Nevertheless, it is true that in a world of perfect correlation between
prescription and enforcement, excessive regulation can no longer be
counterbalanced by real-world evasion techniques. Therefore, while the
possibility of writing the rules into the software and ensuring immediate
compliance presents obvious advantages, the need for an optimal definition of prescriptive jurisdiction deserves special thought. Because
prescriptions can be enforced with accuracy, courts should aim at perfectly calibrated solutions, avoiding the friction that exists in the real
world due to regulatory overreaching and resistance on the part of the
regulated service provider. The incentive to do so should derive from the
increased interconnectedness of activities conducted over the Web and
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the growing interdependency of regulating States. In other words, one
may hope that moderation will breed moderation in the assertion of
regulatory claims, since given the varying interests of States across the
board, all will stand to gain from cooperative attitudes. For example, the
interest of the United States is not systematically in favor of unbridled
expression in cyberspace, particularly when its interest in protecting intellectual property is involved. Conversely, these are instances where
other jurisdictions will be happy to invoke the free flow of data, which
they may reject when it threatens competing local values such as privacy,
the prohibition of hate speech, etc. Subsequently, all should be ready to
subscribe, ex ante, to a rule of reason, under which the benefit from being able to ensure protection of local policies should balance out the
concessions made to other States' conflicting regulatory claims.
Indeed, many courts are fine-tuning technical solutions, striving to
limit the thrust of restrictive regulation in cyberspace to cases where effects felt within the forum State are either substantial or, in the case of
criminal sanctions, deliberate. Thus, the Yahoo! court tailored its injunction to limit its intrusiveness; it ordered access to be blocked in France,
where the targeted data was considered harmful, without interfering with
the other activities of the defendant with respect to the rest of the
world.5 Perfect tailoring provides both the means and the incentives for
perfect compliance and for fine-tuning regulatory claims. As Lessig emphasizes, zoning on the Web has efficiency unmatched in the real
world, 56 and this certainly holds true when applied to international prescriptive jurisdiction.
B. Burden of Implementation
This last Section evokes the remaining, and most difficult, issue, deliberately set aside in preceding developments: Who should bear the
burden, including costs, of implementing the perfectly tailored solutions
discussed above? Indeed, it may be easier to determine "who regulates?"
than to decide who should assume the burden of filtering the data which
the regulating State wishes-legitimately-to make unavailable within
its borders. Although the most realistic solution probably would place
the burden on the regulating State, real-world inequalities between States
may well intrude upon the implementation of a perfect Coasean space.
Curiously, this issue is very often neglected. For instance, the French
decision in the Yahoo! case generated violent criticism in the United
55.
The U.S. cases cited supra note 40 also enjoined the targeting of illegal content into
the forum State, but did not regulate the availability of information elsewhere.
56.
Lessig, supra note 52, at 889 (noting that "[z]oning is coming to cyberspace, with
an efficiency unmatched in real space").
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States and among Internet separatists of France's regulatory claim, even
if such a claim was specifically tailored to the effects suffered within its
borders and can hardly be said to be unreasonable by real-world standards. Yet the fact that the court put the burden of implementing the
filtering on Yahoo! attracted much less attention. Nevertheless, the real
issue seems to be far less "Who regulates?" as "Who bears the burden of
zoning?"
Was it right that the cost of putting into place the filtering technology should have fallen on Yahoo!? Firstly, such a solution is obviously
realistic only insofar as the court's order was enforceable, in the event of
noncompliance, on local assets.57 Moreover, familiar objections arise,
with a slightly different thrust. Should a service provider located in the
United States, whose activity is protected by the First Amendment, have
to bear the costs of restricting access to information in all the countries
which object to its availability? The issue is not to deny the equal ight
of States affected by the data to protect what they perceive as fundamental values, but to distribute equitably the cost of establishing such
protection.
The obvious answer might be to say that, to the extent the website
actively attracts business from the regulating State, there is no reason
why Yahoo! should not bear the costs of compliance. For instance, Yahoo! was making substantial revenue from its business contacts (such as
advertising contracts) with France; requiring it to adapt its software to
the regulatory requirements of the State where it is doing business does
not seem particularly unreasonable. The real world provides all sorts of
instances where the marketing of a product or service requires compliance with local regulations. Given, too, that the service provider is
exporting offensive material into the regulating State, the "polluter pays"
principle could be invoked to justify the same result.
However, more practical considerations of incentive and regulatory
advantage do not necessarily support the "polluter pays" principle in this
context. The State in which the effects are suffered obviously has a
greater incentive to set up technology which will ensure watertight enforcement of its own restrictive regulation: it would certainly make more
sense to leave it to filter the undesired data, to avoid the risk of underenforcement. The receiving State also has the greater regulatory advantage,
because it can best. decide the extent of the prohibition that fits its
57.
Or on assets in a "friendly" foreign State (that is, a State ready to enforce the forum
judgment). In the Yahoo! case, Yahoo! was quick to ensure that enforcement would not take
place in California. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisdmitisme, 169 R
Supp. 2d 1181, 1184-86 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (discussing case history and Yahoo!'s arguments
seeking a declaratory judgment), The revenues generated from its activities in France were
arguably sufficient to ensure local enforcement.
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conception of public welfare and sits in a better position to implement it.
It is far less easy, from the content provider's point of view, to ensure
that no information reaches users located in States where it might be
considered obnoxious. Furthermore, making the receiving State bear the
burden of ensuring compliance could be an efficient means of counteracting the inevitable temptation to overregulate; legislative spillover
might best be avoided by imposing the cost of regulation on the regulating State.
Moreover, it may be that analogies with the real world should not be
pushed too far by forcing the content provider to pay for filtering. If cyberspace is to be an area in which the rule of reason functions
effectively, cooperation between regulating States might be better encouraged by a concession to conventional wisdom, which suggests that it
is more "fair" for the regulating State to pay for filtering. This notion
derives from separatist ideology and is relayed by traditional reliance on
place-of-conduct conceptions. It no doubt felt excessively burdensome to
Yahoo! to implement French regulation while protected at home by the
First Amendment, as it feels burdensome to non-U.S. firms to comply
with federal copyright law when their activity is perfectly legal in the
place of conduct. As there is a likelihood that costs of implementation of
restrictive regulation in these various fields will ultimately cancel each
other out, there may be no point in insisting on a counterintuitive solution by burdening the author of cross-border effects with the cost of
compliance which will inevitably be perceived as unfair-however legitimate it may be to do so in theory.
Whatever the arguments in favor of associating the right to regulate
and the burden of cost, however, this is obviously far from being an easy
issue. The above considerations only become valid if one supposes that
access to filtering technology is equally easy (or burdensome) for all
concerned. However, some regulating States with legitimate reasons to
filter data may lack the technological means or public resources to do so.
Real world inequalities intrude, once again, on the ways in which States
eliminate regulatory conflicts. As a result, it might appear more equitable
to burden private service providers generating revenue from activities
directed at the regulating State rather than on the population of the regulating State. Unfortunately, however, as seen above, compliance will
depend, once again, on the availability of traditional enforcement procedures.
Before the costless solutions of perfect Coasean space can be
achieved, States must overcome their limited technological and pecuniary resources. This prospect leaves obvious room for real-world
cooperation between States. Meanwhile, concessions necessary to sub-
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ject cyberspace to a regulatory rule of reason are certainly worthwhile, if
they can prevent States that feel threatened by excessive freedom of information on the Internet from taking far more radical, aggressive
initiatives to control the flows of data. 8 The specter of technological
warfare as a corollary to prescriptive jurisdiction should not be dismissed
lightly!

CONCLUSION

Calling attention to new issues of prescriptive jurisdiction in the international arena, regulatory conflicts in cyberspace are now frequently
linked to the worldwide availability in cyberspace of data perceived to be
harmful or offensive to fundamental values in the regulating State, while
protected by constitutional freedom of expression in the State in which
they are made accessible. Looking for appropriate means of managing
conflicting regulatory claims, which conventional wisdom sees as either
illegitimate or irreducible, has, first of all, afforded the opportunity to
confirm the legitimacy of yardsticks used to measure prescriptive jurisdiction in the real world. Effects-based jurisdiction, increasingly
supported in the context of conflicts of market regulation in the real
world, seems entirely appropriate here, where the assertion of prescription jurisdiction is generally designed to protect fundamental social
values shared by a community living within the borders of the regulating
State. Indeed, there is no reason that the interests of the society in which
the harmful effects of free-flowing data are suffered should subordinate
themselves to the ideological claim that the use of a borderless medium
in some way modifies accountability for activities conducted through it.
Analysis of such a claim has shown that it reverses the proper relationship between law and technology. Technology being purely manmade
and thus subject to ideological choice, should in no way dictate the way
in which law manages conflicting interests arising through its medium.
Rather, once harnessed to the law, technology can facilitate the exercise
of prescriptive jurisdiction in the international arena, by providing the
means to ensure perfect compliance with regulatory claims over cyberspace, by the use of filtering techniques. In turn, the substitution of
technology for enforcement should create incentives for States to calibrate their regulatory claims so as to avoid counterproductive
overregulation. However, the foregoing depiction of an ideal world of
costless cross-border compliance leaves several difficult issues unsolved.
58.

On the possible development of spy systems, cyberenforcement agencies and other

more "troubling avenues," see Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 277.
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In particular, the burden of compliance requires additional reflection; in
the present state of the world, unequal conditions of access to technology
leave some States more vulnerable than others to the violation of
fundamental social policies or values through the free flow of data in
cyberspace. Although it may appear, therefore, that a case such as Yahoo! has raised as many difficulties as it suggests solutions, it must also
be emphasized that it provides excellent food for thought not only on the
relationship between law and technology, but on the proper calibration of
prescriptive jurisdiction both in cyberspace and the real world.

